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Abstract 
This paper presents a review of evidence pertaining to whether effective corporate governance mitigates agency 
conflict and thus reduces opportunistic accounting earnings management. This study pursues the theoretical 
arguments, (agency theory), that the principal agent relationship provides an insight that effective corporate 
governance plays a significant role in reducing agency conflict and information asymmetry. This is on the 
premise that, it may not be possible to directly observe the managers opportunistic accounting choices, but 
investors (shareholders) have to take action to protect their interests; as a result firms may have to incur higher 
agency costs to mitigate managers’ discretionary accounting choices.  The findings in this study indicate that 
corporate governance monitoring is effective in mitigating managers’ opportunistic discretionary accounting 
choices and reducing agency costs and thus improving the quality of reported accounting earnings. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Earnings management 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper reviews the evidence in the literature pertaining to whether effective corporate governance mitigates 
agency costs and thus reduces opportunistic earnings management. The theoretical arguments (agency theory) in 
the principal agent relationship provide an insight that effective corporate governance plays a significant role in 
reducing agency conflict and information asymmetry. However, it may not be possible to directly observe the 
managers opportunistic accounting choices, but investors (shareholders) have to take action to protect their 
interests. As a result firms may have to incur higher agency costs to mitigate managers’ discretionary accounting 
choices.  
The extant literature argues that corporate governance structures are effective in protecting investors’ 
interests, by monitoring the integrity of the financial reporting process (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Sivaramakrishnan and Yu, 2008). Additionally, corporate governance monitoring is also effective in mitigating 
managers’ discretionary accounting choices and reducing on agency costs (Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; 
Peasnell et al., 2005: Niu, 2006). 
The role of corporate governance is paramount and crucial in attaining a high quality financial 
reporting process and informing investor’s decisions on the value of accounting information (Sampers, 2008; 
Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). Moreover, the introduction of better accounting standards such as IFRS is helpful in 
improving financial reporting only for firms with effective shareholder protection and company specific 
characteristics such as high quality corporate governance (Tanga et al., 2009; Wang and Yu, 2008). Similarly, 
there is evidence to suggest that the effect of the accounting standards on quality of financial reporting is weak 
relative to the effect of forces such as manager’s incentives, auditor quality, regulation, legal enforcement and 
corporate governance (Holthausen, 2009). 
Thus this paper attempts to provide a review of existing evidence of the role of corporate governance 
in mitigating opportunistic earnings management and the contribution of corporate governance to the integrity of 
financial reporting and protection of investors. 
 
2. Agency Theory and Corporate Governance  
2.1 Agency Conflict (Problem) 
Agency theory is based on the relationship the owners of financial resources (principals) strike with the human 
capital (agents) to pursue the creation of economic wealth through industrial production. The owners take risk by 
contributing capital and the managers invest this capital to create wealth for the owners (Fama, 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
The managers are employed by the firm’s owners (equity shareholders) to run the affairs of the firm on 
their behalf; consequently managers are agents of the principals who are the owners. The separation of 
ownership and control may result to conflicts of interests between insiders (managers) and outsiders (owners) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The Agency conflict may increase due to risk generation on the part of the principals (investors) and 
the agents (managers). The principal derives risk by investing in the equity of the firm hoping to generate a 
return for himself. The managers take up risk through provision of labour to manage the investment of the 
principal, with the aim of generating a return to the investment. However, the separation of ownership from 
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management provides the managers with the opportunity to take control of the firm (Berle and Means, 1932, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The control risk increases further when the firm ownership is dispersed, making the 
coordination among shareholders difficult and expensive, therefore managers become de facto policy makers 
(Williamson, 1985; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000).   
Furthermore, because managers are insiders, they have access to the firm’s relevant information that is 
necessary to affect the direction of firms strategic decision making. Consequently, where the managers have to 
make strategic informed decisions; the owners may face a moral hazard problem because the managers may not 
take the full consequences and responsibilities of their decisions and actions, leaving the owners to hold some 
responsibility for the consequences of those actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000). 
The agency relationship is also fraught with conflicting interests that arise due to divergent 
management and shareholder objectives and information asymmetry (Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983).  The owners of the firm are driven by the desire to weigh in their interests against any 
possible losses. They are interested in activities and projects that lead to profit maximisation and cost 
minimisation as much as possible. However, the delegated agents private interests and decision making control 
may draw the owners in another direction (Berle and Means, 1932; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). Consequently, 
when agents become all powerful, they pursue their self interests often to the detriment of value creation for 
share holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal cannot without incurring costs monitor the actions of 
the agent, and acquire the information available to or possessed by the agents in order to realise profit 
maximization and cost minimization ideals (Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000). 
The life span of the agents and the principals in the firm also provides potential for agency conflict. 
Firms have an indefinite life; as a result shareholders are more inclined to having an infinite stream of cash flows. 
However, managers have finite life span and are always limited to cash flows received from their employment 
(Farinha, 2003). This kind of conflict is common when managers are approaching end of contract or retirement. 
Consequently, managers may choose to have short term perspectives on investments, opting for short term 
investments with instant cash flow returns which may not necessarily be value maximising to shareholders 
(Farinha, 2003). 
Agency conflicts coupled with information asymmetry provide a potential for financial reporting 
concerns to arise. However, in the absence of agency conflicts (problems), managers may not have the incentive 
to misrepresent the reported financial accounting information (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Kim and Yi, 2006). 
Where agency conflicts exist, managers have the incentives to maximise their own utility at the 
expense of corporate shareholders (Dey, 2008). In addition, where managers have sufficient latitude in applying 
accounting procedures; they are inclined to take actions that maximise their utility, even when those actions do 
not maximise shareholder wealth (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). These actions include the consumption of 
corporate resources as perquisites, the avoidance of optimal investments and the manipulation of financial 
accounting figures to optimize compensation (Dey, 2008). Moreover, where more equity is sold to outside 
investors, the utility maximising agent has the incentive to appropriate a larger amount of the corporation’s 
resources in the form of perquisites and to exert less than full effort to create value for shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
2.2 Control of the Agency Conflict 





 and risk aversion
3
. Financial reporting does most to combat the information asymmetry 
source of agency conflict. Higher levels of information asymmetry are indicators of shareholders insufficient 
capacity to monitor managers’ actions and possible failure of adequate financial information disclosure practices 
(Schipper, 1989). 
Evidence is provided that, high accounting quality does not only reduce information asymmetry but 
also decreases overall uncertainty in the market. Thus, transparent financial accounting systems play significant 
role in the vitality of financial markets (Qi, Subramanyam and Zhang, 2010). Reduced information asymmetry 
has also advantageous effects on equity and debt market information, therefore benefiting regulators to strive for 
high quality accounting information. These benefits manifests through reduced cost of capital and market 
participants understanding of alternative investment opportunities (Kothari, 2000).  
Moreover, Raffournier (2008) also suggests that the use of IFRS in financial reporting leads to 
reduction in information asymmetry in financial accounting information provided by managers.  IFRS are market 
                                                          
1 It occurs when the terms of the contract encourages pervasive behaviour such that one party provides misleading information or has an 
incentive to take unusual risk before the contract settles. In the firm managers take the risk and owners bear the consequences. 
2 Where, the agent (managers) possesses information that is for the principal (shareholders) unobservable or costly to obtain. 
3 When organizations grow manager’s become risk averse by potentially protecting their interests as opposed to those of the owners. 
Managers would like to maximise opportunities for firms that have already brought in rewards, therefore they continue to build structures 
that increase their opportunity for more control of the firm. 
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oriented and the disclosure requirements are large. IFRS accounting choices are also specific; the manager’s 
application of specific accounting treatments is enhanced and is enforceable. Additional evidence suggests that, 
firms that adopt international accounting standards experience decrease in information asymmetry in financial 
reporting (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000
1
 ; Platikanova and Nobes, 2006; Dumontier and Maghraoui, 2006). For 
instance, Horton and Serafein (2007) argue that in the United Kingdom at the time of transition to IFRS, firms 
reporting IFRS earnings lower than earnings computed according to the UK GAAP were penalised by the market. 
This implied that the market believed IFRS based information as more transparent and reliable.   
A reduction in information asymmetry is also a consequence of higher quality financial reporting and 
practices, coupled with greater oversight by internal and external auditors and directors on the integrity of the 
financial reporting process (Daske et al., 2008; Bruggerman et al., 2009: Li, 2010).  
Information asymmetry can also be reduced through bonding and behaviour contracts that specify 
activities that managers should engage in. As a result each party to the contract will be assured of maximising his 
interests. Principals can also monitor consequences of the agent is behaviour through outcome based contracts. 
One such outcome based contracts are performance related contracts that are reflected in compensation packages 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The principal can also limit the agent’s divergent, self maximizing behaviour by making the agent to 
incur bonding costs
2
. These include retention of equity stake by the managers, or adoption of riskier than desired 
compensation plan. Alternatively, the principals can also incur monitoring costs. These include costs related to 
payments to auditors, independent directors on the board etc (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) also argue that there is always a residual loss. This is because in equilibrium, the marginal 
agency costs should be equal to the marginal benefits of monitoring and bonding.  
Corporate
3
 governance structures have evolved that help in mitigating agency conflicts (Hart, 1995; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance in its divergent forms is effective in mitigating the agency 
problem, and providing high quality financial reporting systems. And given an efficient market provides returns 
to owners’ investment (Sivaramakrishnan and Yu, 2008). 
Because agency conflicts vary across firms, the corporate governance structures required to address 
these problems are also likely to vary. The corporate governance mechanisms available comprise, the market for 
corporate control, large shareholder monitoring, internal mechanisms such as board of directors, various non 
executive directors committees, executive incentives and contracts and the regulatory framework of the 
corporate law and stock exchanges.  
An efficient capital market also functions as a monitoring mechanism for managerial use of resources 
and the actual capacity to maximise value. Farinha (2003) argues that when managers of the firm take actions 
that are deemed by the market to be value enhancing, the price of the assets of such a firm will rise. On the other 
hand, managers’ actions that are deemed by the market to adversely affect the value of the firm’s assets will 
cause the price of those assets to drop.  However, managers may attempt to stifle the efficient functioning of the 
market by managing or manipulating earnings. This will maintain their information advantage over the principals. 
The next section provides evidence that shows that effective corporate governance systems lead to a 
reduction in the agency conflict and an increase in the quality of accounting reporting systems and reliable 
accounting information. Earnings management should therefore, decrease due to a decline in agency conflict and 
a decline in information asymmetry and hence accounting earnings should be more value relevant. 
 
3. Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
3.1Introduction and Definitions of Earnings Management 
Earnings management is defined by Schipper (1989) as, “purposeful intervention in the financial reporting of the 
firm, with intent of obtaining some private gain”. Healy and Whalen (1999) state that, earnings management 
occurs when managers use their judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firm or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers.  
                                                          
1 Leuz and Verrencia (2000) used German data to examine the effect of IFRS and US GAAP adoption on the information asymmetry. They 
used the effect of bid ask spread, the trading volume and the volatility of returns as measures of information asymmetry. 
2 Agents incur bonding costs although these costs are ultimately passed on to the firm and hence to the principal. 
3 Corporate governance has been defined by scholars in various ways. Pass (2006) defines corporate governance in terms of the duties and 
responsibilities of the firm’s board of directors in management of the firm and their relationship with the shareholders of the firm. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), define corporate governance as dealing with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting return on their investments. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) express the Anglo- Saxon approach to corporate governance, from the 
perspective of the capital markets, by focusing on the generation of fair return for the investment. Corporate governance is an 
important factor in an increasingly globalised economy in attracting investment capital and firm sustainability. It provides a 
framework for minimisation of firm risk and promotion of transparency and integrity of financial reporting. Moreover, 
corporate governance provides a basis for defining the relationship between the firm owners and managers, with the objective 
of protecting the interest of the owners. 
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Opportunistic earnings manipulation is done in order to misrepresent the firm’s financial performance 
for the interests of the managers (Beneish, 1999). The manipulation consists of an artificial inflation of revenues 
or deflation of expenses, changes in the timing of expenses and revenue recognition, changes in accounting 
methods for recognition or valuation of assets and liabilities, abnormal rise of asset accounts as a result of non 
writing off of bad debts and accumulated depreciation on the balance sheet date or the capitalization of operating 
expenses (Beneish, 1999 and Aljifri, 2007).  
Opportunistic earnings management is undertaken for various motives. For instance, Burgstanhler and 
Eames (2003) and Payne and Robb (2000) suggest that it is undertaken with the intention of either misleading 
financial statement users or for the purpose of biasing contractual outcomes that depend on accounting earnings. 
Managers also use opportunistic earnings to meet analyst forecasts and raise funds on favourable terms (Magrath 
and Weld, 2002). Some firms also use opportunistic earnings management to avoid violating earnings based debt 
covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Managers also alter earnings using discretionary accrual accounting 
choices to mask (disguise) poor firm performance in order to safeguard themselves from possible dismissal 
(Dhahran and Lev, 1993). 
Ronen and Yaari (2007) suggest that earnings management can be beneficial in that managers take 
advantage of the flexibility in the choice of accounting treatment to smooth earnings so that it signals the 
managers’ private information on future cash flows. This enhances information value of earnings by conveying 
private information to the shareholders and the public (Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon and Kim, 2008; Arya, Glover and 
Sunder, 2003 and Subramanyam, 1996).  Artificial earnings smoothing affects the market perception of earnings 
volatility and hence the share price since smoother earnings are easy to predict. It is a desirable feature of the 
quality of accounting earnings compared to opportunistic earnings management. Nonetheless, artificial earnings 
smoothing by use of GAAP, is associated with costs such as the loss of managers credibility and integrity of 
financial reporting process as a whole (Goel and Thakor, 2003). 
The degree of flexibility and discretion in financial reporting is a key motivator for managers to 
engage in earnings management (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). This is supported by the incentive to 
communicate private value relevant information about the firms’ future performance (Jones, 1991; Healy and 
Palepu, 1993). Information asymmetry also allows managers to manage earnings in order to maximise their own 
interests or to signal their private information, thus influencing the value of earnings (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et 
al., 1995). 
 
3.2 Overview of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Regulation 
When managers manage earnings, accounting earnings reliability as measure of the firm’s financial performance 
may come into question. The less reliable earnings are the less informative and the more difficult it becomes to 
make informed economic decisions and choices (Kothari, 2001). The dependability of accounting earnings is 
improved when managers’ opportunistic behaviour is controlled using monitoring systems (Wild, 1996; Dechow 
et al., 1996).  Corporate governance mechanisms are effective in monitoring of managers’ capacity to manage 
earnings opportunistically (Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2000; Gul and Tsui, 2001). Similarly, Beasley (1996), 
Dechow et al. (1996) and Jiambalvo (1996), show that a negative relationship exists between effective corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial reporting decisions that are breach of the generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
Agency theory suggests a direct relation between effective monitoring of management and reduced 
costs of dysfunctional behaviour, rather than a direct increase of performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Maher and Anderson, 2000). Corporate governance therefore acts as an assurance to shareholders on the 
reliability of information provided by managers. It achieves this objective by monitoring the management’s 
performance and inspecting the financial reporting process of the firm.  
By aligning the interests of shareholders with those of managers corporate governance systems 
enhance the reliability of financial information and the integrity of the financial reporting process (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Strong corporate governance systems (e.g. Cadbury report, 1992; OECD, 1999; The UK 
code of corporate governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, etc) facilitate effective monitoring, thereby 
encouraging managers to use resources more efficiently. The existence of strong corporate governance may 
increase the value relevance of accounting information through a perception of greater integrity of financial 
reporting and improved reliability of managements reported accounting earnings (Cheng et al., 1997). 
However, corporate governance regulation may differ across firms or countries due to investor 
protection requirements and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption (Sarkar et al., 2008). 
Weak legal institutions and weak shareholder protection, means managers are in position to extract private 
benefits of control and conceal the true financial position of the firm from outsiders (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 
2003; Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu, 2004). Leuz et al. (2003) argue that, earnings management is expected to 
decrease with investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control 
benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Leuz et al. (2003) findings highlight an 
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important link between investor protection and the quality of accounting earnings reported to market participants.  
The next section provides evidence on the role of corporate governance structures (mechanisms) that 
are used in monitoring of the financial reporting process and protecting shareholder interests and limiting 
opportunistic earnings management. 
 
3.3 Earnings Management and the Duality of Chief Executive Officer Roles 
There is a debate in corporate governance literature on whether the separation of the position of the board 
chairman from the chief executive officer (CEO) roles leads to better corporate governance. When the chairman 
of the board of directors of the firm is also the CEO, he or she attains a possible dominant position on the affairs 
of the firm. CEO dominance indicates exercise of more control and less monitoring over management adverse 
activities and behaviour (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).   
The role of the board chairman is to monitor the chief executive officer. Consequently the chairman 
will be compromised in his independence between the board and management when the chief executive officer is 
also the board of director’s chairman (Jensen, 1983). Thus, the duality
1
 of the CEO may lead to more 
opportunistic managerial behaviour due to the reduction in effective board monitoring over the executives 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  
Anderson et al. (2003) suggests that the separation of the chief executive officer position from the 
board chairman positively influences the information content of accounting earnings. Dechow et al. (1996) finds 
that firms whose chief executive officer chairs the board of directors are more likely to be subject to the 
accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
2
.  
Sarkar et al. (2008) also argue that, CEO duality and presence of controlling shareholders on the board 
increases earnings management. While Mulgrew and Forker (2006) suggest that, firms where the CEO is also the 
founder have a higher propensity to manage earnings. 
Firth, Fung and Rui (2006), indicate that investors find accounting earnings more value relevant when 
the position of the chairman is separate from the chief executive officer. Meanwhile, Chtourou et al. (2001) and 
Xie et al. (2003) find no relationship between the chief executive officer dominance and opportunistic earnings 
management. Although, contrary evidence exists, the balance of the evidence suggests that firms with non dual 
CEO are more likely to restrain opportunistic earnings management.The board of directors of a firm is the 
shareholders shield against opportunistic behaviour of management (Weisbach, 1998). The board of directors 
formulates strategic direction of the firm (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). It also performs the agency role of 
monitoring management for the shareholders, so that they serve to the best interest of the shareholders (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Board monitoring of financial reports is important because managers often have 
self interested incentives to manage earnings potentially misleading shareholders (Vafeas, 2000). 
Larger boards are more likely to be vigilant because greater numbers of people will be reviewing 
management actions (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). This argument is supported by John and Sebet (1998) who find 
that an increase in the board size is associated with increase in the boards monitoring capacity of management. 
While, Chtourou et al. (2001) and Xie et al. (2003), suggest that larger boards are strongly associated with lower 
levels of earnings management.  
When boards become bigger, they are likely to include more independent directors with valuable 
experience and this will prevent or limit managerial opportunistic behaviour to manage earnings (Xie et al. 2003). 
Increased board size also breeds expertise and diversity from the public (Dalton, 1998). Moreover, the formation 
of committees due to large boards brings in more monitoring effect to all areas of management activities and 
behaviour (Klein, 2002).  
However, Yu (2006) suggests that firms with smaller boards restrain earnings management more 
because of efficiency associated with small numbers. Similarly, Vafeas (2000) argues that the earnings of firm’s 
with the smallest boards in the sample (with minimum of five board members) are perceived as being more 
informative by market participants. Similarly, Weisbach (1998) and Yermak (1996) suggest that some firms 
require smaller boards for effective monitoring of managers activities and their opportunistic behaviour. 
Lipton and Lorsh (1992) and Jensen (1983), also suggest that larger boards are less effective than small 
boards because of higher costs of communication and decision making inefficiencies associated with larger 
boards. Alexander, Fennell and Halpern (1993) argue that managers in firms with larger boards tend to use their 
power to entrench themselves as opposed to smaller boards which are administratively focused and maintain 
their power with frequent review of the performance of the CEO. Moreover, the Higgs report (2003) and the UK 
code of corporate governance seem to suggest that smaller boards are more effective in corporate governance 
monitoring compared to larger boards. 
                                                          
1 In this paper duality of the CEO is used to imply a situation where the CEO is both the chairman and chief executive officer of the firm. 
2 The mission of Securities Exchange Commission of the USA is to protect investors, maintain fair and orderly capital markets and facilitate 
capital formation. 
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The evidence on the role of board size reviewed appears to be mixed. However, there is more evidence 
to support the view that smaller boards are more effective in reducing earnings management and increase the 
reliability of earnings due to increased efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of the board because of to 
its small size. 
 
3.4 Earnings Management and Non Executive Directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983), highlight the importance of outside board members in carrying out the board decision 
control function. Being independent of the management’s influence, outside directors are in a better position than 
insiders to protect shareholders interests from managerial opportunism. In addition, independent boards are more 
effective because they are less vulnerable to undue influence by managers (Weisbach, 1998).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that competition in the outside directors’ labour market compels 
outside directors to have an added incentive to monitor earnings management in order to retain their positions on 
the boards. Moreover, the labour market for non executive directors values non executive directors from firms 
that are performing well. 
Corporate governance codes around the world, in drawing up the procedures for improving the quality 
of financial statements, have emphasised the fiduciary role the boards of directors,( especially independent non 
executive directors on the board) play in the reduction of opportunistic earnings management and in ensuring 
that earnings figures convey true information about the firms operations (Young, 2000). For instance, a pre and 
post Cadbury study, by Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000)
1
 reveals evidence of less income increasing accrual 
management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of non executive directors is high, 
post Cadbury period. 
Outside directors may become effective, not just because they have no economic ties to the company 
beyond their job as directors, but because they are significant shareholders. Disinterested outsiders can mean 
uninterested outsiders, especially where they have a token ownership interest, if any, in the firms they serve 
(Monks and Minnow, 1995).  
Board independence and significantly the quality of the board, is important in mitigating earnings 
management. Boards where members are diligent to their monitoring duty are associated with lower earnings 
management. Diligent boards spend more time scrutinising and monitoring management opportunistic behaviour 
hence enhancing the reliability of reported earnings (Sarkar et al. 2008). 
The board’s ability to successfully curb earnings management is also functionally related to the 
attributes each non executive director brings to the firm. Outside board of directors with financial expertise have 
the ability to scrutinise the reported accounting numbers and dig much deeper hence contributing to reliability of 
reported earnings. While, outside directors with less financial expertise have less ability to scrutinise the reported 
financial reports. They may fail to detect the misrepresented figures that affect earnings hence failing in their 
role of monitoring the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Chtourou et al. 2001). 
However, there is an argument that, boards that have directors with multiple appointments that involve 
several other boards’ exhibit higher earnings management. While these board members bring a wealth of 
experience and expertise, they may not have enough time and opportunity to perform their monitoring role on 
management (Sarker et al., 2008). 
Similarly, Firth et al. (2006) provides an argument that, the existence of non executive directors on 
board of directors is positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals. They suggest increasing the 
non executive directors on the board does not necessarily lead to reduction in earnings management. 
Meanwhile, Park and Shin (2002), also argue that outside directors, as whole, do not reduce abnormal 
accruals. They suggest that its only directors from financial intermediaries that reduce earnings management and 
that boards which are represented by active institutional shareholders reduce earnings management further and 
that earnings management does not decrease with the average tenure of outside directors as board members of 
the firm, either.  
Mulgrew and Forker (2006) find that, earnings management is not associated with the non executive 
director independence or share ownership. These evidence is consistent with that of Xie et al. (2003) and Piot 
and Janin (2005), who find little association between non executive directors independence and earnings 
management. Similarly, Uzun et al. (2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) also fail to identify a significant 
correlation between non executive director independence and the measures of financial reporting quality.  
Although there is contrary evidence on the relationship between earnings management and non 
executive directors; on the balance of evidence, firms with dominant outside directors who are independent are 
likely to restrain opportunistic earnings management. 
  
                                                          
1 Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000), in their study using constant sample, test whether the association between board composition and 
earnings management actively differs between the pre and post Cadbury periods. 
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3.5 Earnings Management and the Audit Committee 
The UK code of corporate governance, for example, proposes that, the firms audit committee should be 
exclusively made of outside directors. The Audit committee meets regularly with the firms’ internal financial 
managers to review the corporation’s financial statements, audit process and the internal accounting controls. 
The work of the audit committee may be complicated, by legitimate differences of opinion that may 
exist between management and outside auditors in how to best apply the generally accepted accounting 
principles.  These differences may result either in the auditor being dismissed or, more likely, in a negotiated 
financial report (Magee and Tseng, 1990; Dye, 1991; and Antle and Nalebuff, 1991).  
Nonetheless, board audit committees contribute to the increase in the level of integrity of the financial 
auditing process and the quality of the financial reporting process (Klein, 2002). This is because, in most (if not 
all) cases audit committees are made of independent non executive directors who bring a wealth of expertise to 
scrutinise the financial reporting process of the firm. There is also evidence to suggest that firms without an audit 
committee are more likely to commit financial fraud (Dechow et al., 1996). Similarly, DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1991) show that the overstatement of earnings is less likely among firms with audit committees.  
McMullen (1996) finds that audit committee existence relates positively to financial reporting quality. 
For instance, the existence of an audit committee is associated with the correction of quarterly earnings; 
suggesting that audit committee scrutinises financial reports and digs out the misrepresented facts. Moreover, 
firms where an audit committee exists tend to report reliable and informative accounting information. Similarly, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005)
1
  suggest that firms with effective board and audit committee structures will have 
manager’s earnings forecasts that are more accurate and elicit more favourable market responses from investors. 
Klein (2002) argues that the magnitude of abnormal accruals are more pronounced for firms with audit 
committees comprised of less than a majority of independent directors. Moreover, firms that change their boards 
and or audit committees from majority independent to minority independent have significantly larger increases 
in abnormal accruals vis- a -vis their counterparts. Klein (2002) findings support the argument that audit 
committees should be constituted of a majority of independent directors. 
Similarly, Wild (1994), Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) argue that, when an audit 
committee is composed of a majority of non executive directors it is associated with a lower likelihood of 
earnings management. Moreover, Ebrahim (2007) finds that the absolute value of abnormal accruals is 
negatively related to audit committee independence and abnormal accruals are much lower when independent 
audit committees are more active.  
The effectiveness of the audit committee is also associated with its independence and the presence of 
finance and accounting expertise. For instance, Bryan et al. (2004) find that audit committee independence is 
positively associated with the information content of accounting earnings. While, Chtourou et al. (2001) suggests 
that the presence of at least one member with financial expertise on the audit committee is negatively related to 
the level of earnings management. And, Xie et al. (2003) finds that firms with high proportions of audit 
committee members with corporate or investment banking backgrounds have lower levels of earnings 
management.  
However, Peasnell et al. (2000), finds no association between the audit committee existence and 
earnings management. Peasnell et al. (2005) also argues that there is no evidence that the presence of an audit 
committee directly affects the extent of income increasing manipulations to meet or exceed thresholds. Neither 
do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre managed 
earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. 
Although contrary evidence exists, the balance of evidence suggests that an audit committee 
contributes significantly to the quality of the financial reporting process. In addition firms with independent audit 
committees are associated with lower earnings management. The effectiveness of the independent audit 
committee is complemented by presence of finance and accounting expertise. 
 
3.6 Earnings Management and Institutional Ownership and Concentration 
Ownership structure is associated with managerial incentives to manipulate accounting earnings (Salamon and 
Smith, 1979). Outsiders who own large blocks of shares have alternative information sources that render such 
manipulation ineffective (Salamon and Smith, 1979). These outside owners are institutional investors or large 
investors such as banks, trusts, insurance companies, and pension funds (Bushee, 1998; Velury and Jenkins, 
2006).  
Increased ownership concentration provides large shareholders with sufficient incentives to monitor 
managers (Ramsey and Blair, 1993). Large shareholders have greater incentives of monitoring management, 
because monitoring costs are less than the expected benefits to their large equity holdings (Demsetz and Lehn, 
                                                          
1 Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examined how corporate boards and audit committees are associated with voluntary financial disclosure 
practices proxied  by management earnings forecasts 
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1985; Stiglitz, 1985). In addition, institutional investors have resources, opportunities and abilities to monitor, 
discipline and influence the actions of managers through formal and informal means (Cubbin and Leech, 1983; 
Diamond, 1984; Monks and Minnow, 1995).   
Firms with large shareholders have a larger capacity for monitoring the discretionary accruals choices 
of managers because they are driven by the desire to maximise value on their investment (Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998). While Barnea et al. (1976), suggests that the incidence of income 
smoothing varies cross-sectionally and in particular with the degree of outside control. Firms with large 
shareholders have lower propensity for earnings smoothing than firms with low or dispersed shareholder 
concentration. Similarly, Yu (2006) finds that firms with strong institutional ownership manage earnings less. 
While Rajgopal et al. (1999) also find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals declines with institutional 
ownership. 
However, when outside ownership is significant, but diffuse, incentives for manipulation are strongest 
because monitoring may not be rigorous. Thus, both the motivation and opportunity for managerial manipulation 
of earnings increases with diffuse outside ownership (Donnelly and Lynch, 2002). While, Hart (1995), suggests 
that when shareholders hold low stakes in the firm, they have little or no incentive to monitor managers, because 
monitoring costs will exceed the gains of monitoring. Thus, dispersed ownership leads to weaker incentives to 
monitor management (Maher and Anderson, 2000). 
Chung et al. (2004) argue that when the collective shareholdings of institutions in a firm are high, then 
significant monitoring of management actions will take place. This contrasts with scenarios where a single 
institutional investor holds a large stake. Alternatively, when institutional investors have relatively low stakes 
(shareholding) in a company, there is less incentive to monitor managerial opportunism. In this case, when 
institutional investors become unhappy with the managers actions, they liquidate their stakes. 
Pound (1988), Faccio and Lasfer (2000) and Renneboog (2000) argue that monitoring of managers 
discretionary accounting actions by institutional investors is not effective. They suggest that agency costs within 
the institutional investor itself might prevent it from being an effective monitor coupled with high liquidity costs 
and conflicts of interests and strategy with other investors. 
Meanwhile, Jacobs (1991) and Porter (1992) argue that institutional investors have a short term focus, 
which puts pressure on management to improve current profitability. In such circumstances, managers have to 
resort to accrual increasing actions to meet the demands of institutional investors because of fear that short term 
disappointment of institutional investors will cause them to liquidate their shareholdings. 
Similarly, Hsu and Koh (2005) argue that short term institutional owners are associated with upward 
accruals management. However, Koh (2007)
1
 suggests that, long term institutional investors constrain accruals 
management and that there is no evidence that short term institutional investors are systematically associated 
with aggressive earnings management; among firms that manage earnings to meet their targets.  
Sarkar et.al, (2008) show that Indian domestic institutional owners act as a compensating control 
mechanism to mitigate the detrimental influence of controlling foreign institutional shareholders. They argue that, 
foreign institutional owners’ interests are always short term, as opposed to domestic institutional owners, thus 
they will recommend accounting policy choices that suit their interest.  
Similarly, Firth et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2002), find that foreign institutional ownership 
(shareholders) appear to lower earnings quality by attempting to persuade managers to adopt accounting 
treatments that suit them which may be less relevant for domestic investors. Firth et al. (2006) also shows that 
firms with highly concentrated share ownership have lower earnings informativeness which they attribute to the 
entrenchment effect, where large shareholders may influence firms to adopt accounting policies that reflect the 
wishes of the large owners rather the economic substance of the business transactions. 
Similarly, Bebchuk (1994) and Stiglitz (1985) suggest that ownership concentration may negatively 
affect the quality of the accounting earnings because large share holders have the capacity to abuse their position 
of dominant control at the expense of minority shareholders. While Velury and Jenkins (2006) also document 
evidence to show that concentrated ownership negatively affects the quality of accounting earnings. 
The literature reviewed on the role of institutional ownership in mitigating managerial discretionary 
accounting choices is mixed. However, the balance of the arguments suggests that institutional owners have 
alternative information sources therefore reduce information asymmetry that renders managers opportunistic 
discretionary accruals manipulation ineffective.  
 
3.7 Earnings Management and Managerial Ownership  
Dechow et al. (2009) discuss the two competing theories about the incentives that managerial ownership 
                                                          
1
 Koh (2007) classified institutional investors by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional type and firms’ 
discretionary earnings management strategies in mutually exclusive settings, that is, firms that use accruals to meet earnings targets and those 
that do not.  
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provides for accounting choice, that is, the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect. Agency theory argues 
that managers with high ownership interest in the firm are less likely to alter earnings for short term private 
benefits at the expense of the outside owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because manager’s interests 
are aligned with those of shareholders; therefore, they will not have the motivation to act opportunistically, and 
report earnings that reflect the underlying economic values of the firm (Warfield et al., 1995: Gul, Chen, and 
Tsui, 2003). Moreover there is evidence that firm’s value is higher when officers and directors have greater 
equity ownership (Yermack, 1996). 
Warfield et al. (1995) also suggest that managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings 
informativeness of returns and inversely related to the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments. Moreover, 
ownership is less important for regulated corporations, suggesting regulation monitors managers accounting 
choices. Similarly, Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) find that insider ownership contributes both to the 
informativeness of earnings and to constraining earnings management when the proportion of shares held by 
insiders is not too high. When insiders own a large percentage of shares however, they are entrenched and the 
relation between insider ownership, discretionary accruals and earnings informativeness reverses. 
Gabrielsen et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
information content of earnings; and positive not significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
discretionary accruals. Meanwhile Rajgopal et al. (1999) finds that there is no significant relationship between 
discretionary accruals and managerial ownership.  
Yeo et al. (2002) find that the informativeness of earnings does not always increase with managerial 
ownership. At low level of management ownership, the informativeness of earnings (level of income increasing 
discretionary accruals) has positive relationship with management ownership. However, at higher levels of 
management ownership, the relationship reverses suggesting that the entrenchment effect might have set in.  
Lacker et al. (2007) find that insiders’ power primarily measured by managerial ownership is positively 
associated with discretionary accruals. Entrenched managers promote their private benefits and use earnings 
management to conceal firm performance from outsiders (shareholders). Managers have the incentive to conceal 
their private control benefits from the outsiders because, if these benefits are detected, outsiders will likely take 
disciplinary actions against them (Zingales, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) suggest that when managers become controlling owners they have 
incentives to manage reported earnings in order to mask true firm performance and to conceal their private 
control benefits from outsiders. For example managers can use their financial reporting discretion to overstate 
earnings and to conceal unfavourable earnings realisations that would prompt outsider to interfere. Insiders can 
also use their accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by understating earnings in years of good 
performance, effectively making reported earnings less reliable than the firms’ true economic performance.  
In conclusion, the review of the evidence on the role of managerial ownership in monitoring 
discretionary choices of managers is mixed. Two alternative views are derived. Increased managerial ownership 
aligns the manager’s interests with that of a firm and is expected to lead to reduced earnings management. 
However, at high level of managerial ownership the managers become entrenched and as such the opportunities 
for management opportunistic behaviour are increased.  
 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
In conclusion, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management attempts to 
empirically show that the attributes of corporate governance are generally associated with reduction in earnings 
manipulations. Such attributes of corporate governance include CEO duality, board composition and 
characteristics and firm ownership.  
Corporate governance monitoring is effective in mitigating managers’ opportunistic discretionary 
accounting choices and reducing agency costs (Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Niu, 2006). Corporate 
governance mechanisms are also effective in monitoring of managers’ capacity to manage earnings 
opportunistically (Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000; Gul and Tsui, 2001; Klein, 2002). Moreover, a 
negative relationship exists between effective corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
decisions that are breach of GAAP (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Jiambalvo, 1996).   
The dependability of accounting earnings is improved when managers’ opportunistic behaviour is 
controlled using monitoring systems (Wild, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996).  Choi et al. (2011), argue that the 
decrease in value relevance of discretionary accruals is high among firms with weak institutions and high 
information asymmetries. Chung et al. (2004), suggests that accounting earnings are value relevant when 
managers’ discretionary actions are controlled using monitoring systems. Such systems reduce information 
asymmetry so that managers’ discretionary choices are seen to maximise or to signal their private information on 
the value of earnings in the market.  High quality corporate governance is also associated with better disclosure 
and less information asymmetry (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).   So regardless of whether discretionary 
accruals are considered opportunistic or if they are a method of signalling private information their value 
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relevance should be increasing with improvements in the quality of corporate governance.  
Moreover, evidence reviewed attempts to provide a justification to the view that accounting 
conservatism and earnings manipulation may not be mutually exclusive. Implying that, firms with strong 
corporate governance have the capacity to use accounting conservatism practices to unmask managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour.  
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